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In this paper I analyze the development of the Japanese telecommunica-
tions industry since 1985, when Nippon Telephone and Telegraph (NTT)
public corporation—a natural monopoly—was privatized and competi-
tion was introduced into long-distance (i.e., interprefecture) markets. At
the outset of the analysis I must stress the extreme importance of changes
in mode of usage as well as technology over so short a period as ﬁfteen
years. This is crucial to the discussion below because there exist some econ-
omists who still live in the “medieval” age, when voice telephony was dom-
inant and the market was structured consistent with this technology of the
time, namely before 1985. Voice telephony has a history of more than 100
years and the imprints of that age still are so strong as to blind some people
to the scope of the new era that started in the early 1990s.
At the same time the nature of competition in telecommunications re-
quires us to conduct a careful examination over the entire period. On the
one hand, technological innovation has increased the choices of telecom-
munications services but it also has blurred the boundary of the market.
We have now several telecom carriers and service providers in the local
market. Does this mean that the local market has become competitive
enough to abolish regulations upon incumbents? Because major telecom
carriers are competing in borderless markets, the question arises: should
the demarcation of the telecom market be based on a national boundary?
Without in-depth empirical analysis we cannot answer either of these ques-
tions.
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ing errors are all mine.From the viewpoint of competition policy, competition authorities like
the Japan Fair Trade Commission must accumulate knowledge in the tele-
communications industry. In the United States, the Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) have a
long history of regulating AT&T and other telecom carriers on a daily ba-
sis or combating AT&T in the court. Consequently they have enough re-
sources and capabilities to deal with the new developments in the telecom
industry. In Japan the public monopoly was not subject to regulation and
antimonopoly laws until recently. It has only been during the last ﬁfteen
years that the government has regulated this industry. It must also be noted
that the Japanese regulator is not an independent authority but rather an
intraministerial bureau.
The government-business relationship plays an important role in the
process of deregulating natural monopoly industries (see Nambu 1997a).
The Japanese institutional traits will be the focus of this paper in order to
make the last ﬁfteen years of the Japanese telecom industry understand-
able.
13.1 Introductory Perspective
This introduction clariﬁes the basic structural changes in technology
and demand that have occurred in the telecom industry relatively recently
(in the last ﬁfteen years) by dividing those years into three periods. This is
necessary because of the many structural changes that have occurred dur-
ing these years.
13.1.1 Phase I: Up To the Early 1980s
Although optical ﬁber technology had been commercially developed
and was partly introduced, telephone networks were almost exclusively
wired with copper technology. Voice traﬃc was carried over a copper loop
and switched at the exchange. In this phase the most striking feature of the
industry lay in the fact that telecom services are homogeneous. Of course,
there existed an artiﬁcial boundary that was set by regulators between lo-
cal and long-distance services. This boundary reﬂected a technological
hierarchy that was intended to realize economies of scale and scope. Long-
distance services are diﬀerent from local services because they are supplied
through a higher hierarchical switching network. But from the viewpoint
of economics, they are identical goods except for the illusion that long-
distance services used to be regarded as luxuries because they were priced
higher than local service in order to realize a cross-subsidy from long-
distance to local services. But not withstanding this fact the breakup of
AT&T was based on the conviction at that time that long-distance service
had a diﬀerent market structure than local service. In the days of Ma Bell,
that is, the days prior to the AT&T breakup, all telephone services were
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thought that the long-distance services were actually “board-to-board”
services.
When AT&T was divested, general agreement existed that the long-
distance (interstate) market was competitive as a result of technological
innovations, whereas the local market was and should remain a natural
monopoly. This dichotomy has plagued the dynamic development of the
telecom industry in Japan as well as in the United States. Even though this
dichotomy was accepted by the majority of economists in both countries,
it should not have been treated as a doctrine. However, as a rule, once reg-
ulatory agencies accept a certain way of thinking, they usually stick to it
until a visible and undeniable change has occurred.
13.1.2 Phase II: From the Middle of the 1980s to the Middle of the 1990s
Structural change came in several ways during this period.
Wireless Technology
Wireless technology is kind of an old technology in a sense that it was
used widely in military and some business applications. The problems with
this technology are the diﬃculty of handling wireless equipment and the
volatility of communication. Once these diﬃculties are alleviated, it is ob-
vious that wireless technology has an extreme advantage over wireline
services. It is also true that wireless technology has often been utilized by
telephone companies as an alternative to wireline technology when 
short-distance voice services are transmitted to the switches. Under the
name of the “geodesic” network, a provocative scenario was presented
wherein the telecom industry could be totally restructured by wireless tech-
nology and this industry could be contestable.1
Cable Television
Cable television (CATV) started as an auxiliary broadcasting service in
a limited area where the terrestrial TV radio signal is very weak. Over time,
it became apparent that this technology could be used in telecommunica-
tions as well. The competitive pressure that CATV exerts against wireline
telephony depends on its penetration rate. In the United States, CATV is
deemed to be competitive with telephony although the quality of CATV
service providers is controversial. In Japan, CATV has not reached this
stage. Though the history of CATV is rather short, it has been demon-
strated that CATV can eﬀectively compete with local telephone companies
and provide broadband services as well.
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1. The idea was ﬁrst introduced by Peter W. Huber in a report to the Department of Justice,
The Geodesic Network (Huber 1987). The second version was published in 1992 (Huber, Kel-
logg, and Thorne 1992).Internet
The development of the Internet as a popular data transmission vehicle
has changed the telecommunications market as well. It took years for tele-
phone businesspeople to be convinced that the Internet is a new commu-
nication device and to dismiss their old paradigm as a result. The diﬀerence
between the Internet and telephony is especially remarkable at two points.
First, routers replace switches but switches are designed to ensure perfect
connection among subscribers. Second, Internet users prefer to be contin-
uously connected without having to pick up a phone. These particularities
of the Internet have imposed changes upon telephone companies and reg-
ulators but there have been noteworthy diﬀerences in the speed of compli-
ance with these changes among countries. Although aware that they are
challenged by these fundamental structural transformations, the telephone
companies and their regulators have not been quick to change their view of
the industry.
13.1.3 Phase III: From the Middle of the 1990s to the Present
Faced with revolutionary changes in the telecommunications industry,
the legislators set out to initiate a new framework corresponding to the new
economic reality. In 1996 the Federal Communications Act of 1934 was
amended in the United States and was enacted for the purpose of realizing
competition between long-distance carriers and regional Bell operating
companies (RBOCs). In Japan the long dispute over the NTT managerial
form was settled in 1999 and the reshaping of NTT was realized by creation
of a holding company with the three subsidiaries, NTT East and West
(which are local companies) and NTT communications (which is a long-
distance and international company). However, these two reforms, both in
the United States and in Japan, up to now appear not to be fruitful.
It has become clearer during this period that new entrants into the tele-
com industry found and employed a new strategy: namely, “politicizing”
(gaming) entry conditions for the purpose of reducing entry costs and
risks. New entrants learned that they could lower entry barriers by arguing
to policymakers that incumbents are always trying to preclude entry. This
is economically beneﬁcial to the new entrants because they can reduce
their entry costs if they do not need to invest in new facilities that might be
sunk in the future. At the same time, regulators have learned that they can
cater to the public by protecting entrants and quarrelling with incumbents.
Their interests coincide to put pressures upon incumbents.
In the case of the United States, the focus of the disputes among regula-
tors, entrants, and incumbents lies in the diﬃculty of fulﬁlling the check-
points imposed on the RBOCs by the 1996 act. Once these checkpoints are
fulﬁlled, the RBOCs can enter the long-distance markets. It is natural that
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they face a high probability of losing their customers.
The Tauzin-Dingell bill was discussed in the House of Representatives in
the United States in 2001. This bill intends to give RBOCs the freedom to
invest in broadband services on an inter–local access and transport area
(inter-LATA) basis.
The Japanese government has begun to discuss the possible reshaping of
NTT, which was reorganized in 1999.
13.2 Historical Background
13.2.1 The Creation of a Public Monopoly
The Japanese choice of industry structure after privatization in 1985
may be better understood by looking back on the origin of the system
of telecommunications service provision established in 1957. After World
War II, the Japanese government faced the problem of rebuilding an infra-
structure that had been destroyed by the war. This infrastructure was re-
quired to support rapid renovation for economic development. There ex-
isted conﬂicting opinions as to how to structure the telecommunications
service provider. Japan ultimately chose a public-corporation type of com-
mon carrier for telecom services. The public corporation was called Den-
den Kosha, or the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone public corporation,
which was placed under the supervision of the Diet but independent of
the regulatory oversight of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications
(MPT).
The idea of Kosha was to create independence for the investment policy
for telecommunications facilities. Denden Kosha succeeded in eliminating
the backlog demand for subscription to the telephone network. This ob-
jective was accomplished around 1977 or 1978. During this developmental
period the Denden Kosha served as a public monopoly with a bureaucratic
administration that worked to provide telecommunications services to the
public. On top of that, Denden Kosha’s board members consisted of car-
rier bureaucrats who had moved from the Ministry of Communication that
existed until 1949. It is often observed that bureaucrats do not initiate new
business forms until they are absolutely certain that the old forms are not
appropriate any longer. This type of behavior nourished the corporate cul-
ture of NTT and it was liable to complaints and criticism directed at its in-
ﬂexible and slow response to changes in demand, especially from the busi-
ness world.
Amid the global wave of deregulation in the United States and privati-
zation in the United Kingdom, the Japanese government decided to priva-
tize NTT in 1985. The initial institutional arrangements were as follows:
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NTT became a private company but was a special entity because more
than 51 percent of its shares were held by the government. It also inherited
a public obligation as “universal service.”
2. Instead of the Public Telecommunications Law, the Telecommunica-
tions Business Law became the key determinant of the industrial structure
of the telecom industry. Under this law, telecom service providers are clas-
siﬁed into two categories, Type I and Type II. The former owns telecom fa-
cilities, whereas the latter rents them from Type I carriers.
3. The MPT2 was put in charge of regulating Type I and Type II carri-
ers. In the day of the public monopoly, Denden Kosha was under the sur-
veillance of the national Diet. At the time of Denden Kosha, regulation by
the MPT was rather nominal. Therefore there did not exist any conﬂict be-
tween MPT and NTT. In fact, the Kosha system itself was created in order
to encourage and respect the independence of Kosha.
13.2.2 NTT versus MPT: Institutional Stalemate
In this section I analyze the structural diﬃculty of decision making in
Japan from the viewpoint of the Japanese regulatory scheme as compared
to the regulatory schemes of the United States and the United Kingdom.
First, the Japanese regulatory scheme might be called a simply uniﬁed
jurisdiction system, in the contrast to that of the United States, where sev-
eral agencies are competing with each other (e.g., the FCC, the DOJ, state
public-utility commissions, and the court in the case of telecommunica-
tions). Contrary to this decentralized system in the United States, there
usually exists in Japan one ministry that is in charge of a certain industry
or industries. In some cases, this type of centralization has been challenged
by other ministries. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry, or
MITI, used to challenge MPT because MITI regulated the computer in-
dustry. If MITI’s challenge had been eﬀective, the concentration of power
in MPT would have been weakened. But up to now MPT has not faced a
serious challenge. As a result, Japanese telecommunications regulation has
been centralized in the hands of MPT.
The diﬀerence between a centralized and a decentralized regulatory
system seems clear when we compare Japan and the United States. The
comparison between Japan and the United Kingdom, however, raises a
diﬀerent problem. These two countries have a centralized bureaucracy in
common, although in the case of the United Kingdom, the Oﬃce of Tele-
communications (OFTEL) was newly created for regulating the telecom-
munications industry. The creation of telecommunications regulatory pol-
348 Tsuruhiko Nambu
2. The name of MPT vanished during the recent restructuring of ministries, and MPT has
become a regulatory agency in the Ministry of Public Management, Home Aﬀairs, Posts, and
Telecommunications.icy is in the hands of top executives who are appointed by the government,
whereas Japan has a tightly integrated, hierarchical structure of bureau-
crats. It is a good contrast that, unlike in Japan, political appointees in the
United Kingdom are requested to articulate their own philosophy of regu-
latory policy.
Second, it is instructive to look at the business-government relationship
in Japan as compared to that in the United Kingdom. In Japan, MPT was
given jurisdiction over the telecommunications industry for the ﬁrst time in
1985. NTT public corporation was privatized at that time, but it naturally
inherited the bureaucracy created during the days of Kosha. Being ambi-
tious to apply an industrial policy toward the telecommunications indus-
try, MPT invited new entrants into the industry and tried to protect them
from the dominance of NTT. The means of protection has been to place
NTT under the strict regulation of MPT. As a result, conﬂicts between
MPT and NTT have not been unusual. NTT, being an integrated bureau-
cracy, had accumulated a deep knowledge of the telecommunications in-
dustry and is still the most knowledgeable service provider. MPT was a
latecomer that was lacking in industry-speciﬁc expertise when it was given
the authority to regulate the telecom industry. But MPT took the approach
of omnipotent regulator from the outset. As a result, Japan had two bu-
reaucracies that claimed legitimacy.
In the United Kingdom the new regulatory agency, OFTEL, took a
diﬀerent approach toward British Telecom (BT). OFTEL adopted price-
cap regulation, which is intended to give positive economic incentives to
the incumbent ﬁrm. In addition to allowing ﬂexible rate rebalancing by
BT, OFTEL admitted one new competitor, Mercury. Price-cap regulation
meant that BT did not face the same ﬁnancial diﬃculty as NTT because it
could rebalance its rates in a few years after privatization in 1984, although
BT always claimed the existence of an access deﬁcit. The policy goal of
OFTEL had been announced clearly by the director general and the nego-
tiation between OFTEL and BT did not include fatal conﬂicts such as there
used to be in Japan. Sometimes OFTEL was criticized for being too indul-
gent to BT. This is in contrast to Japan, where MPT protected new entrants
by hemming in or handcuﬃng NTT.
By comparing these cases we can tentatively conclude that “bad” busi-
ness-government relationships, and conﬂicts and strains between regula-
tors and the regulated ﬁrms, bring about a serious time delay in meeting the
challenges of a change in environment. Consider especially the incredibly
rapid change of telecommunications technologies. Slow decision making
as a result of the regulatory scheme is the greatest obstacle to industrial de-
velopment. Slow decision making is typically the case in Japan, especially
with respect to the introduction of arrangements for new businesses.
NTT’s business was narrowly restricted to the domestic market, where new
entrants were allowed to earn handsome proﬁts from the continuing high
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trants failed to exhibit innovative marketing to create new services. Next,
the diﬃculties of the Japanese telecommunications industry brought on by
a bad business-government relationship are examined.
13.2.3 Dispute over Divestiture
Before privatization of NTT, there was a discussion of the possibility of
an NTT divestiture, à la the AT&T breakup in 1984 in the United States.
But no conclusion was reached and it was decided that the discussion
would be resumed in 1990. At that time, MPT proposed the breakup of
NTT based on a report issued by the Telecommunications Council. How-
ever, the Ministry of Finance, the Telecommunications Labor Union, and
the politicians were against MPT’s proposal and no conclusions were
reached in 1990. During this second discussion the conﬂict between NTT
and MPT became clearer. NTT refused the idea of divestiture, and MPT
refused to abandon it. Although Denden Kosha was privatized, the two bu-
reaucratic systems had reached a stalemate.
The Japanese stock market responded negatively to this situation and
the NTT stock price dropped drastically. As a result, any further ﬂotation
on NTT stocks became impossible. This induced a huge capital loss for
NTT stockholders and had an adverse inﬂuence upon the possible ﬂota-
tion of other public corporation stocks, such as the Japan Railways (or
JRs; the Japan National Railway was privatized and reshaped into seven
JRs). This kind of confrontation between the regulator and the regulated
ﬁrm inevitably creates uncertainty about the future of the industry.
In 1995 the discussion on the possible divestiture of NTT was resumed,
but again, no conclusion was reached. At this point in time, the structural
change of the telecom industry appeared clearer. The U.S. government had
proposed the National Information Infrastructure scheme to enhance the
development of information technology. The National Information Infra-
structure anticipated that a new industrial structure might be needed to
capitalize on improvements in information technology. It has now become
essential to determine how to structure the telecom industry consistent
with potential of information technology. The most plausible scheme for
facility-based competition in the local telephone market is based on the
emergence of new information technologies.
The most likely facility-based entrants into the local market were the
long-distance carriers. In 1996 the Federal Communications Law was en-
acted to break the old boundary between local and long-distance services.
The political situation in Japan at this time was about the same. There
were  only a few examples of competition in the local market. Tokyo
Telecommunication Network Co., Inc. (TTNet), a subsidiary of the Tokyo
Electric Power Company, entered the Tokyo area and Osaka MediaPort
Corp. (OMC), a consortium of an electric power company and others, en-
350 Tsuruhiko Nambutered the Osaka market. But the geographic area covered by the entrants
was very limited and accounted for almost nil.
The Japanese government needed to settle the old dispute over NTT’s or-
ganizational form if it was to foster further competition. At last a compro-
mise was worked out in 1999. A new holding company was created that al-
lowed the old NTT’s three divisions to become three separate subsidiaries
of the new NTT Holding Company. However, this conclusion to the dis-
cussion of the breakup of the old NTT contains inherent contradictions.
13.2.4 Rate Rebalancing and Access Charges
In the United Kingdom, BT was allowed to rebalance its rates as part of
the implementation of price-cap regulation, whereas in the United States
ab r and of new access-charge system was established as a condition of
the AT&T divestiture. But in Japan, neither rate rebalancing nor access
charges were introduced (ﬁg. 13.1).
This is mainly because NTT and MPT collided on the question of the lo-
cal and network access deﬁcits. NTT had provided estimates on the size of
these deﬁcits but MPT refused to accept them. MPT wanted a structural
solution in the form of a structural separation, and to make the industry’s
cost structure visible to industry observers. NTT complied with MPT’s
wishes by changing its managerial structure into a long-distance business
center and local telephony business centers. This structural division is
based upon artiﬁcial and arbitrary allocation of the common costs of the
whole company. If there had existed mutual conﬁdence and trust between
NTT and MPT, the NTT’s deﬁcit problem would have been solved earlier.
But this was not the case. The delays associated with reaching an agree-
ment have brought about serious economic distortions in the Japanese
Japanese Telecommunications Industry since 1985 351
Fig. 13.1 Comparison of rate rebalancing: Japan, U.S., U.K. (1984   100)telecommunications industry. Rate rebalancing is necessary to restore a
signaling function of price that is not distorted by the cross-subsidy system
of the monopoly era. On top of that, telecom technologies have been ever-
changing. If rates continue to be biased by artiﬁcial cross-subsidies, the
new technology cannot ﬁnd its suitable place in the market. Consequently
the delay caused by the regulatory conﬂict has inﬂicted tremendous social
cost to Japan from the viewpoint of income distribution as well as eﬃ-
ciency.
It was not until 1994 that an agreement on an access-charge payment
was established. The new common carriers (NCCs), which are equal to the
other common carriers (OCCs) in the United States, were required to pay
about 20 billion yen in addition to the local rate that they already paid to
NTT. This additional payment is approximately equal to, say, what NCCs
used to be paid in the form subsidy from NTT subscribers. The imposition
of a new access charge meant that hidden subsidy was removed. This had
a negative impact upon the NCCs’ proﬁtability, which, in turn, inﬂuenced
their investment strategy. If the access-charge arrangement had been real-
ized earlier, then the NCCs’ investment behavior might not have been
aﬀected so badly. The delay in the resolution of access-charge issues may
have given the wrong signal to the NCCs, causing them to invest in low-
density areas throughout the country.
13.2.5 Punishing NTT Policy
In the dynamic process of change from monopoly to competition, sev-
eral structural amendments are necessary to abolish the old institutional
restraints. The most basic regulatory framework is based upon a system of
cross-subsidy between local and long-distance telephony. As usual, the lo-
cal telephone rates are maintained at lower levels than their costs on the
grounds that local telephone service could not be viable without subsidy.
In preparing for the introduction of competition in the long-distance
market, it was deemed necessary in the United States and the United King-
dom to reshape this cross-subsidization mechanism. In contrast with
them, Japan was a unique country where no discussion on issues such as
access charges or rate rebalancing occurred. The Japanese government
simply ordered the newborn NTT to continue to provide local as well as
long-distance telephone service without changing its tariﬀ structure. This
would mean that new entrants into the long-distance market can earn ex-
traordinary proﬁts by charging slightly lower prices as compared to the
NTT tariﬀ. MPT oﬃcially admitted that this regulatory policy amounted
to cream-skimming by the new entrants. NTT must suﬀer losses in the
long-distance market while it continued to provide below-cost local ser-
vice.
In Japan it was partly justiﬁed on the basis of apathy toward “monop-
oly” ﬁrms. NTT was, in the eyes of the government, an ineﬃcient monop-
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a result, it was argued, NTT could respond to the competition by reducing
its extra costs. In other words, suﬀering is a necessity for the rebirth of
NTT. This point of view is valid as far as there exist extra costs to be re-
moved, but it is a “once-and-for-all” remedy because extra costs must dis-
appear in the process of competition with newcomers. But the reality at
that time was that there existed no apparent signal from the government
concerning the time horizon of its policy, which resulted in the sharp and
sustained decline of NTT’s share price ever since the issue of the stock in
1985.
13.3 Competition in the Long-Distance Market
The three NCCs, Daini Denden Incorporated, Japan Telecom, and Tele-
way Japan, entered and began telephony service in 1987. They successfully
competed with NTT because there existed a price diﬀerential between
NTT and NCCs.
Figure 13.2 shows that the price of an NCC was about 15 to 20 percent
lower than NTT’s regulated rate. If NTT had been allowed to match the
NCCs’ price without delay, the advantage of the NCCs may not have been
so great. But NTT was not allowed to do so and the price diﬀerential ac-
counted for the NCCs’ success. In the face of this outcome we must ask
whether the NCCs’ success was justiﬁable from the viewpoint of eﬃciency.
Under the Telecom Business Law, the number of competitors in the
market was regulated by MPT pursuant to a supply-and-demand balanc-
ing clause. MPT allowed three NCCs to enter and cream-skim the long-
distance market. Cream skimming was possible because NTT was not al-
lowed to rebalance its rate or to impose access charges on these NCCs. At
least two of three NCCs made huge proﬁts since the early 1990s. Figure
13.3 shows the markup rate diﬀerences among carriers. From 1995, the
markup of NCCs declined because of the introduction of an access charge
and price reductions by NTT.
Another problem with the initial introduction of competition into
Japan’s long-distance market is a deep concern with dynamic eﬃciency. No
one can know whether newcomers, once selected by MPT, are eﬃcient
challengers of NTT. Unlike in the United States, where the number of
competitors in the long-distance market was not regulated by the FCC,
Japan could not depend upon the usual entry and exit mechanisms to even-
tually sort out the eﬃcient and ineﬃcient ﬁrms. The Japanese style of reg-
ulation cannot guarantee the kind of eﬃciency that should be a trademark
of a newly competitive industry.
The advantageous status of NCCs can be justiﬁed, in theory, as provid-
ing protection to an infant industry. But as is clearly discussed in the eco-
nomics textbooks, the government cannot protect newcomers forever.

















































































































































































































































































































































































.There must always exist some time limit (sunset) when protection comes to
an end and is replaced by the free entry of other ﬁrms; otherwise, the wrong
signals will be sent to the existing three ﬁrms. If MPT had sent a signal to
the NCCs in the early stages that it would abandon their protection, the
NCCs might not have misunderstood their position as permanent and
might not have invested excessively to exploit quasi rent from protection
(see ﬁg. 13.4).
It is clear that the NCCs tried to exploit quasi rents in the 1990s. Because
of their high proﬁtability on the one hand and mutual competition on the
other, they expanded their business areas throughout the country. How-
ever, there are diminishing returns when long-distance carriers increase
the points of interface since the busiest business areas in Japan are con-
centrated in a limited number of large cities like Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya,
Fukuoka, and Sapporo. If the NCCs had given proper consideration to the
possibility that they would lose their government protection, it is reason-
able to conclude that their investment might have been restricted to certain
areas. But they were sluggish to change their business policies even in the
face of competition from discounters like AT&T that are not Type I car-
riers.
With the development of price competition in the late 1990s, the three
NCCs met ﬁnancial diﬃculties in the long-distance market. This was
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tsimply because voice telephony service is homogeneous and, as a result,
product diﬀerentiation is impossible. This is a common phenomenon in
any country. When long-distance rates are approaching their marginal
costs, competition may well be ruinous, as was often seen in the past.
Their tenure was ended by the following events (summarized in ﬁg. 13.5):
• Teleway Japan Inc. was established by the Toyota group. This company
failed to expand its business nationwide and vanished in December
1998, merging with Kokusai Denshin Denwa Co., Ltd. (KDD).
• KDDI was created by the merger between Daini Denden Inc. (DDI)
and KDD; Nippon Idou Tsushin Corp. (IDO) joined KDDI in Octo-
ber 2000.
• Japan Telecom (JT) was created by the Japan National Railways, and
International Telecom Japan, Inc. (ITJ) was absorbed into JT in Oc-
tober 1998. Vodaphone owns 45 percent of the JT shares. TU-KA Cel-
lular Tokyo, Inc. (mobile) phones joined Vodaphone in August 1998.
• TTNet is a subsidiary of Tokyo Electric Power Company. It succeeded
in acquiring local telephone subscribers in the Tokyo area, and its
turnover is nearly 200 billion yen.
Some remarks are possible based on the review of the NCCs’ history.
The intent of the regulator to foster long-distance competition has failed
in the following sense. The number of entrants had been limited to three.
Nobody could know whether these ﬁrms were eﬃcient challengers to NTT.
Accordingly, Japan needed to introduce a mechanism to examine the eﬃ-
ciency of new entrants into the long-distance market. MPT could abolish
entry regulations on the long-distance market, as was done in the United
Kingdom in 1990. If entry had been liberalized in the early 1990s, the ad-
dition of new long-distance carriers could have been speeded up. The pro-
tectionism of MPT invited the eﬃciency loss.
The entry of NCCs may be regarded as a success in the sense that NTT’s
long-distance share dropped to almost 50 percent. Without entry pressure,
NTT’s dominance would have persisted. This argument is well taken, but
there still is the question of whether NTT’s lost market share was captured
by the most eﬃcient entrants. Without free entry, there is no guarantee that
the most eﬃcient new entrants absorbed NTT’s market share. In fact, it is
doubtful whether this kind of substitution happened in the Japanese long-
distance market.
13.4 Competition in the Local Market
Although it was generally believed at the time of the codiﬁcation of the
Japanese Telecom Business Law that the local telephone market was a nat-
ural monopoly, new legislation allowed competitors into the local market
immediately. The ﬁrst entrants were electric utility companies that created
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subsidiary companies in each of their franchised regions. In this sense the
Japanese institutional framework seems to be progressive in developing lo-
cal telephony competition, but in reality, local competition has not ad-
vanced as expected. There are several reasons for this: Local competitors
have been handicapped severely because their interconnection with NTT’s
local network is asymmetrical. Subscribers to an electricity company’s
telephone network could telephone and talk to each other but NTT cus-
tomers could not reach those subscribers. Local rate rebalancing did not
occur and below-cost rates remained in force. This made local bypass ex-
tremely diﬃcult compared with the United Kingdom or the United States.
In 1995 MPT ﬁnally decided to introduce the concept of the intercon-
nection charge (at that time, it was called an access charge). Ten years had
already elapsed since the NTT privatization, when the method of calculat-
ing the interconnection cost was established.
In order to enhance competition, the interconnection rate has a funda-
mental importance. At the same time it is quite diﬃcult to interpret that
rate in an economic sense. The diﬃculty comes from the fact that the
majority of the embedded local interconnection costs are sunk, whereas
the opportunity cost of interconnection is ever-changing because of rapid
technological progress. On top of that, there usually exist huge diﬀerences
in cost structure from district to district that are caused by geographical
and demographic factors.
Except for the busiest business districts, the choice of local carrier is very
limited. MPT decided to apply the concept of the essential facility to NTT.
In each prefecture NTT was regarded as the essential facility and the in-
terconnection rate had to be calculated according to the approved ac-
counting rule. The rate is shown in ﬁgure 13.6.
Fig. 13.6 The interconnection rateAfter the introduction of the interconnection rate, issues concerning the
rate level were raised by the NCCs and the United States Trade Represen-
tative. In the United States and the United Kingdom, the concept of long-
run incremental costs was introduced to calculate the interconnecting cost,
because historical cost could not reﬂect the technological progress that
had reduced the cost of local exchange drastically. On the other hand, lo-
cal carriers have to suﬀer from the stranded costs, namely, the costs that
cannot be recovered because long-run incremental costs are used to calcu-
late the interconnection rate.
In 2000 and 2001, NTT reduced the interconnection rate drastically. The
result was as expected. NTT’s revenue decreased and its proﬁts went down
to their lowest level ever.
The local telephone market experienced a dramatic change in the late
1980s in the United States and the United Kingdom. Local competition
was based not upon institutional niches that allowed cream skimming but
on bypass technology that was developed by ﬁrms that wanted to reduce
their payments to the local telephone companies. Rate rebalancing and the
imposition of access charges are the most important stimuli for bypassing
the local network, because they encourage competition in the local market.
The typical bypass technologies are the mobile telephone and CATV.
These technologies challenge the cost structure of the incumbent’s old
technology. They can realize economies of scale without requiring huge
numbers of customers. That is, the critical mass necessary to compete with
a local telephone company is not very large.
Japan has been in a strange situation in the context of development of
local competition. First, the competition between cellular technology and
local telephony has not developed well simply because mobile telephone
service had been too expensive. Second, competition was limited among
the cellular companies that were not direct competitors to NTT’s local net-
work. Third, the regulatory scheme hampered competition once again.
Wireless radio-service providers used to be deﬁned as Type I carriers by the
Telecom Business Law. As a result, MPT must regulate these carriers with
regard to a tariﬀ and to entry and exit conditions. Their rates had to be
based upon accounting costs, which cannot be lowered without realizing
the critical mass of subscribers. Strategic pricing to combat the local tele-
phone network was not permitted because the requirement for ﬁnancial
stability as a Type I carrier was binding to avoid discontinuity of service.
13.5 Mobile Phones
It was not until the end of 1996 that MPT relaxed its tight policy upon
the mobile industry and that industry began to explode. Under the new
regime, mobile phone companies were set free to quote their prices, and
ﬁerce price competition was invited. Mobile companies were permitted to
360 Tsuruhiko Nambusell handsets and users could freely choose the style of their handsets. The
development of the mobile phone industry in Japan has been characterized
by the support of youngsters whose willingness to pay is much higher than
that of average consumers. Mobile phones are not the usual telephones
that have been regarded as a necessity, but are a kind of luxury item that
can serve a large variety of optional demands, from amusements (e.g.,
games) to business needs. We must also note that the distinction between
local and long-distance services has completely disappeared among mo-
bile phone users. This has also happened in the case of the Internet. The
development of the number of mobile subscribers is depicted in ﬁgure
13.7. The rate of growth represents demand potentials that used to be sup-
pressed by MPT’s conservative policies.
The technological advantage of wireless over wireline is obvious. It is
predicted that mobile phones can convey broadband services, as well. If
this prediction is valid, then the telephone industry must be structured in a
manner consistent with the future direction of technology. It may also im-
ply that the old wireline technology can survive only as a supplement to
mobiles. Wireline service can be a useful vehicle for providing broadband
services at low prices. In any event, wireline is a huge national asset that
must be utilized wisely in the future.
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Fig. 13.7 Cellular and car phone revenues
Source: InfoCom Research, 1999 estimates.13.6 Broadcasting and CATV
The Japanese television industry consists of three types of major broad-
casters: terrestrial, satellite, and CATV. The industry has been regulated by
MPT. It was, and to a certain extent still is, our tradition that the adminis-
tration is divided vertically into several jurisdictions. The information in-
dustry is under a dramatic structural change and the convergence of broad-
casting and telecommunications is obvious. However, in the ﬁeld of
broadcasting there has existed a kind of ideological bias against competi-
tion: the freedom of the press, democracy, public order, and morals, to
name a few examples.
The Japanese regulatory scheme has an inherent time lag but it is chang-
ing very rapidly. In this regard it is very diﬃcult to foresee the future direc-
tion of regulation toward broadcasting. MPT is going to review the total
regulatory regime for broadcasting and telecommunications. It is recog-
nized that the present laws are preventing a smoother conversion of the two
industries whereas, in reality, the NTT group is going to enter broadcast-
ing-satellite data broadcasting and Nippon Hoso Kyokai (NHK) is plan-
ning to enter telecommunications.
In this section I describe the industrial structure of the Japanese broad-
casting services and discuss the regulatory scheme, which is in transition.
13.6.1 The Market Structure of Terrestrial Broadcasting
Terrestrial broadcasting services have been provided by two types of en-
tities in Japan. One is the government-owned NHK and the others are
private companies. There exists competition between NHK and other
private broadcasters, although the former can collect fees from the public
for signal reception. The private companies depend upon advertising rev-
enues from their television and radio shows. They are shown in table 13.1.
The ratio of radio business revenue to total revenue is less than 20 percent
over the past ten years.
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Table 13.1 Market Share (March of each year; %)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Nippon Hoso Kyokai (NHK) 17.6 20.2 20.7 21.5 22.6 22.4 21.6 20.7 20.6
Japan News Network 21.8 21.2 20.5 20.0 19.3 19.6 19.7 19.3 20.4
Nippon News Network 19.3 18.5 18.5 18.4 18.4 18.7 19.2 19.7 19.3
Fuji News Network 20.6 19.8 20.0 20.4 19.9 19.6 19.4 19.7 19.5
All Nippon News Network 14.9 14.3 14.1 13.7 13.6 13.9 14.1 14.3 14.0
TV-Tokyo Network 3.9 4.1 4.3 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.3
Independent Broadcasters
Association (DOKU) 2.0 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 1.6 1.7 2.0 1.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Merrill Lynch.There are six private broadcasters and they own regional broadcasting
stations in each prefecture. Furthermore, there exists vertical integration
between the parent broadcasters in Tokyo and their regional broadcasters.
The market structure of this industry is oligopolistic: NHK represents 20
percent of the industry, and the other three private companies have com-
parable shares.
13.6.2 The Development of Satellite Broadcasting
Japan has two types of satellite broadcasters; one relies on broadcasting
satellite (BS) technology and the other relies on communications satellite
(CS) technology. In the use of BS, Japan has been a leader and has made re-
markable progress in its space CATV network. After the industry solved
the technical problems of broadcasting satellite–3, this satellite business
has been growing.
In the BS broadcasting industry, NHK is in the dominant position, fol-
lowed by Japan Satellite Broadcasting, Inc., or JSB (WOWOW), as shown
in table 13.2.
In contrast to BS, the growth of CS business has been slow.
PerfecTV entered the market in 1996 and merged with J Sky B in 1998 to
become SkyPerfecTV. The number of subscribers is 1.73 million. DirecTV
started its business in 1997 and has obtained 0.41 million subscribers thus
far. DirecTV is far away from the break-even point, however. In 2000,
SkyPerfecTV and DirecTV were combined to form a new company that is
led by Sony and Fuji TV.
Based on the recent development of the CS broadcasting industry, MPT
reportedly wants to deregulate it further. There exists regulation prevent-
ing entry by NTT and major terrestrial broadcasters, but MPT is expected
to deregulate entry especially with regard to licensing the next generation
of CS technology. The focus of regulation will be shifted to the oversight of
the capability of program production and ﬁnance, which may give more
opportunity to the NTT group.
13.6.3 CATV Industry and Deregulation
In 1955 CATV broadcasting started as an auxiliary device of terrestrial
broadcasting in areas where radio signals are hard to reach. CATV has be-
come a community media source since the 1970s through the development
of multichannel and two-way communications. Although the Japanese
CATV industry grew steadily at the rate of 20 percent in the ﬁrst half of the
1990s, its growth was not so impressive as the growth that occurred in the
United States. In the latter half of the 1990s, however, there seems to have
been a speeding-up of CATV development. This is due to several factors:
1. The diversiﬁcation of CATV programming, made possible by the ini-
tiation of CS digital broadcast


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.2. A deregulation policy that made it easier to open up new stations and
create a multisystem operator (MSO), which is indispensable to broadcast-
area expansion
3. An increase of competition among CATV companies, with a result of
increased promotional activity to gain subscribers.
4. The future prospect of providing telecommunications services, espe-
cially in the application of the Internet
The eﬀect of the change of the MPT’s regulatory regime has been no-
table. MPT announced deregulation of the joint use of head-ends in 1997
along with abolishing the foreign capital restriction upon CATV and Type
I telecom carriers. In 1998 MPT decided to simplify the authorization pro-
cedures for starting CATV operations. CATV operators that are permitted
to operate as Type I telecom carriers increased dramatically. The develop-
ment of CATV operators is shown in table 13.3 (parts A and B).
With the increase of full-service operators (CATV plus telecommunica-
tions), competition has been accelerated. Two examples are noteworthy in
this regard. Jupiter Telecom (located at Suginami-ward) began rate cuts
and large volume discounts in 1998. Titus Communications (located in
Chiba city) initiated the elimination of the setup charge that used to be a
barrier for new subscription. This company also introduced free night ser-
vice for calls within its telecom network. Furthermore, Titus has become
the ﬁrst CATV operator to oﬀer an integrated service including multi-
channel, telephony, and Internet services.
Looking back on the development of the CATV industry in Japan, we
ﬁnd several features that are not existent in the United States:
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Table 13.3 CATV Operators
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
A. The Development of CATV Operators
Number of facilities 625 740 830 937 973 1,030 984
Number of subscribers 
(  10,000) 242.2 314.3 363.7 500.1 672.0 793.6 947.1
Household penetration 
rate (%) 5.6 7.2 8.2 11.2 14.6 17.0 20.0






Source: InfoCom Research (2001).
Note: Penetration rate   subscribed households/registered households. See text for explana-
tion of abbreviations.1. The terrestrial broadcasting services in Japan are pervasive all
through the country. The reason is a geographic diﬀerence between the
United States and Japan. The United States is a ﬁfty-state country and
Japan is a one-state country. Although Tokyo and Osaka are giant cities,
they are part of only one state—Japan. This is quite diﬀerent from the
United States. Cities such as Los Angeles, Chicago, Denver, and New York
are city centers in each state. In the one-state model, like Japan, it is easier
for the incumbent broadcasters to become dominant and the nationwide
audience has been more attracted to the information from Tokyo. This has
hampered the development of CATV as a community-based broadcaster.
2. The regulation of MPT tended to prevent entry into CATV, espe-
cially because of the stress it put upon a close connection between broad-
casting and community and local content. These restraints had a negative
inﬂuence on the potential proﬁtability prospects of the CATV business.
3. Along with the regulation above, ownership of multiple CATV sta-
tions was not possible for a long time and this made it diﬃcult for CATV
operators to reach a critical mass.
13.7 The Coincidence of Disputes over the Telecommunications Industry
Looking around the developed countries, we notice that each of the as-
sociated telecom industries faces the same problems, that is, the delay of
development of competition, especially from the viewpoint of regulators.
In 1996, the Federal Communications Act of 1934 was amended with the
expectation of the rapid emergence of competition between local and long-
distance carriers. In 1999, NTT was restructured. A long-distance service
provider was separated from local telephone companies in order to en-
hance competition. The results up to now, however, are rated poor by the
regulators and legislators in both countries.
In the United States two things are happening at the same time. The
Tauzin-Dingell bill is going to be introduced to let RBOCs invest in inter-
LATA broadband services. This is equivalent to opening up a big hole on
the 1996 act because legislators are more concerned with the development
of broadband services than with the voice telephony. The Tauzin-Dingell
bill appears necessary because the examples of entry by long-distance car-
riers into local markets and the entry of local companies into the long-
distance market are scarce. This is a result of the fact that the conditions of
the 1996 amendment of the communications act have rarely been met. Ac-
cording to the 1996 act, local carriers must satisfy almost forty checkpoints
indicating that they have opened up their local markets before they are per-
mitted to enter into long-distance markets. In typical cases, AT&T and
RBOCs do not reach an agreement easily. AT&T argues that RBOCs are
always precluding entry by failing to fulﬁll the checkpoints, whereas the
RBOCs reply that the checkpoints are satisﬁed to a reasonable extent. This
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players aiming at the lion’s share of the entry beneﬁts. The Tauzin-Dingell
bill puts aside this stalemate and pushes another type of competition that
looks more important for national interests.
At the same time, AT&T has began lawsuits in several states such as
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Florida. AT&T claims that the structural
separation of RBOCs is essential to realize fair competition in the local
market. The structural separation is based on a vague distinction between
wholesale and retail. However, it is noteworthy that controversy over the
industrial structure of local telephony has resumed again.
The situation looks similar in Japan. Except for mobile telephones, the
pace of entry into local markets seems slower than expected by regulators.
The market share of NTT is 90 percent nationwide. It also is true that lo-
cal competition has not occurred in every corner of the country. It has been
concentrated in large cities and central business districts. This is simply be-
cause it is not proﬁtable to enter most of Japanese local markets. Popula-
tion density is low and few business centers are located in the majority of
Japanese cities. This is a reﬂection of the geological features of Japan. But
competitors of NTT never miss the opportunity to accuse NTT of an in-
tent to prevent entry into local markets. The lack of competition in rural
areas and small cities cannot be attributed to entry prevention. The news
of low penetration rates in local telephony, however, gives suitable credi-
bility to their attack on NTT.
I call this phenomenon “politicizing” entry conditions. Network indus-
tries such as telecommunications, gas, and electricity have common char-
acteristics in that entrants rely upon a transmission mechanism that is
owned by the incumbents to provide services. As a result, they have two
choices. They can construct their own network if the rental prices of the
transmission mechanism are higher than the cost of new investment. How-
ever, it often occurs that investment in a core network is impossible for en-
trants because of huge capital costs and their sunk nature. At this time
there usually is a heated discussion on the appropriate rental prices for ac-
cess, interconnection, and transmission or transport services.
New entrants can always beneﬁt from arguing that the rental price im-
posed by the incumbent is too high to make entry proﬁtable. If we have a
neutral authority to judge the fairness of network fees, then the problem
can be solved. In some cases the incumbents may be ordered to lower their
prices, and in other cases entrants must pay in full the prices set by the in-
cumbents or choose not to enter the market.
In eﬀect, the neutral authority must have the ability to judge the eﬃcacy
of new entrants in order to prevent ineﬃcient entry.
The solution to the problem becomes less clear when we do not have this
neutral authority but instead have an inherited bureaucracy that usually
intends to encourage new competition. The bureaucracy wants to be in the
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accomplish this task is to blame the incumbent for preventing entry if ex-
pected competition does not emerge.
The risks associated with politicization lies in the fear that new entrants
are permitted to survive even if they are not eﬃcient. Ineﬃcient entrants
may not be able to pay the network fees because they do not have more-
eﬃcient equipment than the incumbents, or because they lack the knowl-
edge to make use of the new technologies available. But politicization pre-
vents the exposure of ineﬃciency. Therefore, no one knows whether the
new entrants are eﬃcient. This is not the case when politicization is absent.
In this case new entrants may enter and fail because they do not have the
opportunity to plea for benevolence.
In network industries the doctrine of “bottleneck” or “essential facility”
has become a major source of the phenomenon of politicizing the entry
conditions.3 New entrants can use the doctrine to weaken incumbents in
preparation for obtaining greater market share in the future. If these en-
trants prove to be eﬃcient and compete with the incumbents on an eco-
nomic basis in the future, people are lucky. But if they are ineﬃcient and
collude with incumbents in the future, the result is a total loss to the coun-
try. In the name of dynamism some people argue that the expected loss is a
fee for the realization of competition. This is true only if we have a fair in-
stitution that selects eﬃcient competitions. Here we will turn to the prob-
lem of NTT restructuring.
13.8 Future Reforms
In Japan, as in the United States or the United Kingdom, the incumbent
problem is likely to be revisited. Before arguing for another reform of the
NTT group, I will point out several diﬃculties inherent in the present form
of the restructured NTT. The reshaping of NTT in 1999 was meant to close
the long-standing debate begun in 1985 regarding the necessity of break-
ing up NTT. The present structure of NTT is the result of a pure compro-
mise between NTT and MPT. NTT is satisﬁed with the present form be-
cause it was not divided into independent companies. In theory, the NTT
holding company can control their subsidiaries. MPT is satisﬁed because
it can point to the three structurally separated companies (NTT East, NTT
West, and NTT Communications) that are independent of each other.
From the viewpoint of economics, however, the new NTT has several ba-
sic diﬃculties. First, as was discussed, the distinction between local and
long distance (and international) is nonsense. Second, neither NTT East
nor NTT West can provide long-distance or interprefecture services.
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3. On the economic rationale of the doctrine of “bottleneck” on “essential facility,” see
Nambu (1997b).Third, NTT Communications naturally wants to enter the local markets
because the roots of business lie in the local market. The conﬂict of inter-
est within one entity is damaging the eﬃciency of the holding company.
The basic design of the system is an old paradigm of “dichotomy” that has
existed since the medieval age of telecommunication.
During the process of the past reform some economists argued that NTT
East and NTT West could be allowed to compete with each other. The the-
ory underlying this argument is diﬃcult to understand because we cannot
ﬁnd any incentive for two ﬁrms to squeeze into each other’s market. From
the viewpoint of the NTT holding company, such behavior is a zero-sum
game. If NTT East and West are allowed to provide long-distance and in-
ternational services as well, each would have an incentive to enter the
other’s market. But this is forbidden. Faced with the slowness of local tele-
phone competition the government may ﬁnd it necessary to restructure the
present NTT system. At this time I must stress several points for the na-
tional interest that must not be ignored.
13.8.1 Dividing NTT East and NTT West
The discussion to divide NTT local companies into pieces is economi-
cally nonsense. If people think that the obstacle of entry into local markets
comes from the fact that NTT East and West are monopolies, then the idea
of dividing them into smaller pieces will make the matter even worse. The
local companies do not have incentives to enter into a rival market if they
are restricted to providing local service. In fact, smaller local companies
will have ever stronger incentives to defend their markets. On top of that,
some of the new local companies will face additional ﬁnancial diﬃculty,
even more so in the rural areas since they will be deprived of the capability
of cross-subsidy within their territories.
13.8.2 Risks of Mergers and Acquisitions
No Japanese ﬁrm is free from the risk of being taken over by the current
globalization of mergers and acquisitions. Looking at the share values of
NTT subsidiaries, it is obvious that some ﬁrms may be acquired by foreign
carriers. The idea of further dividing the NTT group will lower their share
prices even more. Without an eﬀective countermeasure for the ﬁrms in the
NTT group, the risk of takeover cannot be neglected.
13.8.3 Plural Eyes upon Wireline and Wireless
Technological change has brought about a new era in which mobile
phones play a more important role than wireline service. The advantage of
wireless over wireline is obvious, but there also exists a complementary re-
lationship between the two. The main usage of wireline will lie in a contin-
uous, even all-day, interconnection that not possible or desirable for a wire-
less technology. Therefore, for a telecom enterprise both types of services
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competitive domestically as well as globally. NTT must be able to provide
both services in order to combat global carriers.
13.8.4 Radio Frequency
There exists an institutional problem that needs to be solved concerning
the distribution of scarce radio frequency. The United States took the ap-
proach of auctioning oﬀradio bandwidth, which resulted in astronomically
high prices. Those prices must be charged to the mobile carriers’ services
but it is not clear whether the mobile carriers will be able to pass these prices
on to their customers. Of course, on the other hand, a rationing method
overseen by the government results in an arbitrary distribution of scarce re-
sources, which is foreign to eﬃciency. For the moment nothing has been
made clear as to the method of apportioning radio frequency in Japan.
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Comment Il Chong Nam
Professor Nambu’s paper is a very interesting and informative one both as
a paper on the Japanese economy and as a paper on the telecommunica-
tions industry. A large part of his paper is devoted to the comparative anal-
ysis of the Japanese telecommunications industry and those of the United
States and United Kingdom. His analysis is quite comprehensive and cov-
ers all of the important markets, including broadcasting and Internet mar-
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Il Chong Nam is professor at the KDI School of Public Policy and Management, Korea
Development Institute.kets. One can learn a lot from his paper about how the same fundamental
change in technology could lead to diﬀerent evolutionary paths for the
same industry in diﬀerent countries endowed with diﬀerent infrastructures
concerning the way market and government work. As an economist inter-
ested in public enterprises, I ﬁnd this paper especially interesting and quite
unique in that it oﬀers a rare opportunity to take a look at how the Japan-
ese MPT bureaucracy responded to the pressure of structural reform
caused by technological innovation.
The evolution of the telecommunications industry from a government
monopoly to a partially regulated competitive market involved fundamen-
tal changes in the corporate governance of former public enterprises, in the
industry structure, and in the regulatory regime. It also requires that func-
tions and authorities of the former line ministry, MPT in the case of Japan,
must change substantially. Professor Nambu shows that Japan took an ap-
proach that is substantially diﬀerent from those of the United States and
United Kingdom on most key issues on liberalization of the telecommuni-
cations industry, such as industry structure, corporate governance of the
dominant carrier, and regulation on rates and access charges.
I think the most signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the path Japan took and
those taken by the United States and United Kingdom lies in the corporate
governance of former monopolists and in the role the government plays af-
ter liberalization. In the United States, ownership and control have always
been in private hands, and regulatory functions were separate from the
management of carriers. In the United Kingdom, ownership and gover-
nance of BT was handed over to private investors. Regulatory functions
were also separated from the management of BT. In Japan, on the other
hand, NTT is still majority owned and controlled by the government, and
the regulatory regime does not appear to be independent.
I think the public nature of NTT’s ownership and control lies at the core
of the Japanese telecommunications industry and the policy of the Japan-
ese government thereupon. I also think many of the diﬀerences in industry
structure and regulation between the Japanese telecommunications indus-
try and those of United States and United Kingdom, listed in Professor
Nambu’s paper, could be traced to NTT’s ownership and control. It seems
that a closer investigation of corporate governance of NTT and how it
aﬀects the policy functions of the Japanese government could lead to a bet-
ter understanding of the telecommunications industry and the eﬀective-
ness of policy thereupon in Japan.
I have some speciﬁc points that I would like to take up.
I think that more detailed information on the ownership and control of
NTT will be helpful. Information on actual ownership structure and the le-
gal and policy environments surrounding the nature of government own-
ership in NTT will clarify the incentives of NTT managers as well as bu-
reaucrats at MPT.
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subject to some laws that do not apply to the ﬁrms owned purely by private
investors that make NTT’s corporate governance diﬀerent? Even if NTT is
formally subject only to company laws, the question remains as to the na-
ture of the government as the dominant shareholder of NTT. As the dom-
inant shareholder, does the government concern itself only with the com-
mercial performance of NTT or is it interested in using its control over
NTT to promote some policy objectives that are not compatible with proﬁt
incentives of NTT?
Moreover, it would be interesting to ask what speciﬁc mechanisms there
are for the government to resort to in trying to force NTT to perform pol-
icy functions, which could conﬂict with its commercial objectives. Which
ministry or agency within the government exercises the share-holding right
of NTT is also a relevant question because the nature of government in-
volvement in the governance of NTT depends on it. If MPT wields the
shareholding right, as it appears, it will be tempted to use its control over
NTT to promote its policy objectives toward the telecommunications in-
dustry. If this happens, it will aﬀect NTT’s incentives and the degree of
competition among various carriers that compete with NTT, as well as reg-
ulation.
It is also interesting to ask why Japan chose a liberalization path that al-
lowed MPT to continue to play the potentially conﬂicting roles of “man-
ager of NTT,” “maker of industrial policy for the telecommunications in-
dustry,” and “regulator,” even though these roles conﬂict with each other.
I am also puzzled by the choice of the holding-company system for NTT.
NTT East and NTT West are both 100 percent owned by NTT. It would
not be easy to induce serious competition between two local monopolies
even if they are independent ﬁrms. In the case of NTT East and NTT West,
both are subsidiaries of NTT. It is not clear to me what incentives the two
local monopolies have in competing with each other. If the Japanese gov-
ernment somehow succeeds in forcing NTT East and NTT West to actu-
ally compete with each other, there remains the question of why NTT
should own NTT East and NTT West. Most major carriers around the
world have been adopting holding-company structures in recent times.
However, their motive was to raise internal eﬃciency, not to foster compe-
tition among its subsidiaries to increase social welfare.
The evolution of the telecommunications industry in Japan described by
Professor Nambu raises more fundamental questions about the way eco-
nomic systems evolve in diﬀerent countries. The role of the state, the cor-
porate governance of large ﬁrms, and the way the ﬁnancial market is or-
ganized and functions seem to be linked closely with each other and aﬀect
the way markets and regulatory functions evolve over time. It seems that
the way the market and government are organized and function in Japan
makes it diﬃcult to transform a government monopoly into a market-
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dustrial policy objectives are separated.
My last comment is on a trend in the industry that appears irreversible.
Mobile services are replacing wired services rapidly. It would be interest-
ing to see how the mobile market has been evolving in Japan; in particular,
information about the evolution of the mobile market as well as the domi-
nant player, NTT Docomo, and its relationship with NTT would signiﬁ-
cantly enhance our understanding of the Japanese telecommunications
market. Development in the third-generation market and the policy of the
government toward this market also are key to understanding the future di-
rection of the Japanese telecommunications industry.
Comment Richard H. Snape
I have enjoyed reading Professor Nambu’s paper and have learned much
from it. Some of the features of Japan’s telecom industry are unique to
Japan, but many are to be found in other countries also. These relate to
problems of transition to competition in an industry in which the incum-
bent has been a protected, government-owned monopoly and in which
there have been many cross-subsidies required by the government for po-
litical and social reasons; and in which there is very rapid technological
change and convergence of technologies such that in the future there is
likely to be an integrated communications, information, and entertain-
ment medium.
There are some points which I would like to take up.
I think there could be more emphasis on the distinction between com-
petition in facilities and in services. At this stage there is still limited com-
petition for the copper local loop (outside central business districts). In
many areas and for some services the local loop still has properties of mo-
nopoly and essential facility. While mobile phones are booming in Japan
and many other countries, a high percentage of such calls still originate or
terminate on copper. Outside central business districts, wireless is still not
suitable for two-way broadband, and hybrid ﬁber coaxial (HFC) cable is
generally far from ubiquitous in roll-out. So at this stage of development,
access and terms of access to the local loop are still relevant for competi-
tion in services for much of the population in Japan and elsewhere. As Pro-
fessor Nambu notes, this leads to the “politicization” of access—good reg-
ulation will be aimed at reducing this politicization or gaming.
Professor Nambu notes the bad relations between the incumbent and
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emeritus professor at Monash University. He passed away in the fall of 2002.regulators. Of course, if this reﬂects ignorance on the part of the regulator,
this is bad and should be remedied, though there will always be some asym-
metry of knowledge. But I would expect tension between the incumbent
(coming from a protected monopoly position) and a regulator trying to
bring competition—indeed, I would be worried if there weren’t such ten-
sion.
In a number of places the paper refers to “fairness” of prices—I would
prefer a focus on eﬃciency of prices.
Professor Nambu very rightly refers to regulations aﬀecting broadcast-
ing—with convergent technologies we also need convergent regulation. In
a number of countries we have policies promoting competition in telecoms,
but regulations that protect incumbents in broadcasting. Such policy dis-
sonance can only frustrate development.
The paper speaks of the risk of foreign take-overs. Already Vodafone
owns a mobile phone company in Japan. I am uncertain as to what the risk
is.
I note that new entrants are “selected” by MPT. Why is such selection
required? Is it more selective than the “beauty contest” for the allocation
of scarce spectrum undertaken in a number of other countries?
The Productivity Commission is undertaking an inquiry into telecom
regulation in Australia. We are setting out some principles for regulation.
They include:
• Telecom policy should aim at securing eﬃcient outcomes rather than
competition in its own right, or the protection of particular competi-
tors.
• Social objectives are best targeted by other policy instruments or by
explicit subsidies aimed at the objective.
• Policy should be technologically neutral.
• Regulation should apply only to areas where there are clearly identi-
ﬁed problems and where regulation is an eﬀective remedy. It should be
transparent, predictable, accountable, and consistent.
• Where there are real bottlenecks justifying regulated access pricing, it
is important to encourage eﬃciency in the use of telecom infrastruc-
ture while maintaining incentives for investment.
• Regulation should be such that the incentives for business are to make
a better return from procompetitive consumer orientation, than from
market foreclosure or regulatory gaming.
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